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HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD FLATS, TRUST AND 
OTHER EQUITABLE DOCTRINES 
Although 85% of the population of Singapore reside in 
Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) flats, this area of 
the law remains largely under investigated. A perennially 
contentious issue is the complex interplay between equitable 
doctrines and the Housing and Development Act. In this 
article, the author reviews the jurisprudence pertaining  
to express trust, resulting trust and common intention 
constructive trust and the HDB flat. This article will also 
examine the applicability of other doctrines such as donatio 
mortis causa and proprietary estoppel in relation to the HDB 
flat. In particular, this article will explore the applicability of 
the common intention constructive trust and proprietary 
estoppel in providing a potential remedy to disinherited 
wives and caregivers. 
TANG Hang Wu* 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), LLM, PhD (Cambridge); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, 
National University of Singapore. 
I. Introduction 
1 This essay investigates the interplay between equitable doctrines 
and the Housing and Development Act (“HDA”).1 As we will see, the 
drafters of the HDA initially started with an express prohibition against 
all forms of trust over Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) flats. 
Since the HDB has strict rules on eligibility of ownership, it was 
concerned that persons who were ineligible to own a HDB flat might 
create trusts to circumvent these rules.2 However, HDB discovered that 
such a blanket prohibition was an over-inclusive rule as it did not cater 
                                                                       
* The author is grateful to Lim Lei Theng, Lim Hui Min, Louis D’Souza and Chong 
Yue-En who have worked with him on some of these issues at the Legal Aid 
Bureau. The ideas in this paper were first presented at a talk entitled “Trusts and 
HDB flats” at the Legal Aid Bureau on 6 May 2011, and “Current Issues in Private 
Client Business: Wills, Wealth Planning and Succession” at the Singapore Academy 
of Law on 21 November 2011. Comments and questions from the participants 
sparked many of the arguments developed in this paper. The author also owes a 
debt of gratitude to the anonymous referee who provided him with very helpful 
comments. The usual disclaimers apply. 
1 Cap 129, 2004 Rev Ed. 
2 See Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (24 August 1984) vol 44  
at col 2025 (Teh Cheang Wan, Minister for National Development). 
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to HDB flat owners who might legitimately want to create a trust in 
favour of their minor children. Early versions of the HDA also did not 
deal with the issue of the application of a resulting and constructive 
trust over HDB flats. Despite the legislator’s hostility to the trust, the 
Singapore courts have interpreted the HDA purposively and held that 
resulting and constructive trust claims were not barred if it did not 
offend the HDB rules on eligibility of ownership. Various apparent 
attempts were then made by the drafters of the HDA to extinguish the 
resulting and constructive trust which proved to be unsuccessful; the 
courts continued to adopt a purposive reading of the HDA to preclude a 
resulting or constructive trust only in instances where it arises in favour 
of ineligible owners. The main argument in this paper is that modern 
equitable concepts are not to be feared; properly used, these doctrines 
might achieve fine-tuned justice between parties. In fact, as this essay 
will demonstrate, a complete prohibition against all forms of trusts 
arising over a HDB flat has the potential to create even more injustice 
between parties who might have a stake in the flat. 
2 The main aim of this paper is to study the complex interplay 
between equitable doctrines and the HDA. In this article, the 
jurisprudence pertaining to express trust, resulting trust and common 
intention constructive trust and the HDB flat are reviewed. This article 
will also examine the applicability of other equitable doctrines such as 
donatio mortis causa and proprietary estoppel in relation to the HDB 
flat. In particular, this article will explore the applicability of the 
common intention constructive trust and proprietary estoppel in 
providing a potential remedy to disinherited wives and caregivers. 
II. Eligibility conditions of ownership of HDB flats3 
3 In order to make sense of the jurisprudence in this area, the 
eligibility conditions of ownership of HDB flats need to be understood. 
Under the HDA, the HDB is empowered to make rules with regard to  
a myriad of matters concerning the HDB flat.4 This power includes  
the right to dictate conditions pertaining to the acquisition and the 
alienation of the flat, such as the person to whom the flat may be sold, 
the income ceiling of the potential purchaser, the citizenship status of 
buyer and the persons who are allowed to stay in the flat. The overarching 
                                                                       
3 For an overview of the Housing and Development Board, see C L Tai, Housing 
Policy and High-Rise Living A Study of Singapore’s Public Housing (Chopmen, 
1988); Housing a Nation[:] 25 Years of Public Housing in Singapore (A Wong &  
S Yeh eds) (HDB, 1985); S Y Tan, Private Ownership of Public Housing in Singapore 
(Marshall Cavendish, 1998); Tan Sook Yee’s Principles of Singapore Land Law  
(S Y Tan, H W Tang & K Low eds) (LexisNexis, 2009) ch 24. 
4 Housing and Development Act (Cap 129, 2004 Rev Ed) s 65. See also D Ong, 
“HDB Policies: Shaping Family Practice” [2000] Sing JLS 110. 
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philosophy of the HDB’s housing policy on eligibility conditions is stated 
to be “pro-family.” Hence, the usual scheme5 in which a person is eligible 
to buy a HDB flat is if he or she forms what is known as a “family 
nucleus”. A “family nucleus” is defined by the HDB as consisting of a 
buyer and one of the following: (a) a spouse; (b) parents; (c) children 
(for a widower or divorcee); and (d) fiancé/fiancée. For potential 
purchasers of HDB flats who are orphans, the family nucleus may 
consist of siblings. 
4 At this point, a few observations need to be made about these 
HDB rules on eligibility of ownership. First, these rules are dynamic and 
may be subject to change. For example, there has been a softening of the 
“pro family” policy as single persons over the age of 35 years are now 
allowed to purchase three room or smaller flats on the HDB resale 
market under the Single Singaporean Citizen Scheme.6 Another example 
of such a change in policy is the Joint Singles Scheme, where two 
unrelated and unmarried Singaporeans who are older than 35 years old 
are eligible to jointly purchase a HDB flat. Second, while HDB insists in 
most cases that a purchaser must form a family nucleus, it does not 
mandate that the husband and wife must be registered as co-owners. 
Thus, it is possible for the husband or the wife to be registered as the 
sole owner and the other spouse who is not an owner to be listed as a 
permitted occupier. Finally, some important pre-conditions of acquiring 
a HDB flat include: (a) being a Singaporean or a Singapore permanent 
resident; (b) not owning another HDB flat7 or private residential 
property in Singapore or elsewhere; and (c) being at least 21 years old. 
III. Express trusts over HDB flats 
5 As mentioned above, the original HDA contained a blanket 
prohibition on trusts created over HDB flats. This rule was contained in 
the former s 44 of the HDA, which provided that every such trust shall 
be regarded as null and void. Section 44(4) of the HDA used to provide:8 
Every trust or alleged trust, whether the trust is express, implied or 
constructive, which purports to be created in respect of any such flat, 
house or other building by the owner thereof shall be null and void 
and shall be incapable of being enforced by any court. 
6 The rationale for this bright line rule was to prevent ineligible 
persons purchasing a HDB flat through nominees by way of a trust. 
                                                                       
5 The best source of the HDB rules is via the HDB website <http://www.hdb. 
gov.sg/>. 
6 See also H W Tang, “The Legal Representation of the Singaporean Home and the 
Influence of the Common Law” (2007) 37 HKLJ 81. 
7 Housing and Development Act (Cap 129, 2004 Rev Ed) s 47. 
8 Referred to in Cheong Yoke Kuen v Cheong Kwok Kiong [1999] 1 SLR(R) 1126 at [18]. 
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While the original aim of this section was laudable, the general bar on 
the creation of a trust proved to be an overly wide rule. There are some 
circumstances, especially when minors are involved, where people may 
legitimately wish to settle an express trust over a HDB flat. As the then 
Minister for National Development, Mr Teh Cheang Wan, explained:9 
Over the years, however, there has been increasing need for the HDB 
to permit the creation of trusts for legitimate reasons. For example,  
it is necessary to empower trustees to hold flats in trust for minor 
children who are citizens in the event of death of the lessee parent,  
and where the surviving parent is neither a citizen nor a permanent 
resident and therefore not eligible to assume ownership of the flat. 
Similarly, in some cases of legal separation or divorce, flats have to be 
held in trust for minor children until they reach the age of 21 years. 
7 Consequently, the HDA was amended to allow for trusts to be 
created in these circumstances. The current version of the legislation 
governing the express trust is contained in s 51(9) of the HDA,10 which 
reads as follows: “[e]very trust which purports to be created in respect 
of any protected property without the prior written approval of the 
Board shall be null and void”. Thus, the current position is this: the 
creation of an express trust over a HDB trust is not prohibited per se, 
only trusts which have not obtained prior written approval from the 
HDB are considered to be null and void. However, there is an aspect 
which remains unclear: the situations in which the HDB would consider 
the creation of a trust as being legitimate, apart from a trust created for 
minor children on the death of the lessee parent. For example, would 
the HDB approve a trust in the following circumstances: (a) a trust in 
favour of an offspring with special needs on the passing of the lessee 
parent?; and (b) a trust in favour of a lessee who has lost mental 
capacity? Logically, the HDB should have no objections to the creation 
of such trusts. It is suggested that the HDB should state clearly either on 
its website or subsidiary legislation instances in which it would approve 
the creation of a trust over a HDB flat. Such a move would certainly 
assist lessees, especially those with minor children and special needs 
dependents in planning their affairs. 
8 The recent case of Chong Sze Pak v Chong Ser Yoong11 is 
illustrative of an express trust which was clearly in breach of the HDA. 
In this case, the plaintiff claimed that he paid for all the outgoings of the 
HDB flat registered in the defendant’s name, including the instalment 
payments of the HDB loan. In return, the defendant agreed by way of a 
deed to hold the HDB flat on trust for the plaintiff. Under the terms of 
                                                                       
9 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (24 August 1984) vol 44 at col 2025 
(Teh Cheang Wan, Minister for National Development). 
10 Housing and Development Act (Cap 129, 2004 Rev Ed) s 51(9). 
11 [2011] 3 SLR 80. 
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the trust, the defendant was to transfer the HDB flat to the plaintiff ’s 
son when he turned 35 years old. The difficulty with the plaintiff ’s trust 
claim was the fact that the plaintiff was ineligible to purchase a HDB 
flat. Similarly, the plaintiff ’s son was also not entitled to purchase a HDB 
flat in his own name until he turned 35 years old. As such, Woo Bih Li J 
had no difficulty in holding the purported express trust in favour of the 
plaintiff and his son null and void. 
9 There are numerous issues surrounding an approved express 
trust over a HDB flat which remains unanswered. For example, the 
precise procedure involved in obtaining approval for the creation of an 
express trust from the HDB is not found anywhere. The following 
hypothetical facts are used as an illustration to demonstrate the myriad 
of difficult issues that may arise due to this lack of clarity in procedure. 
Suppose X has a HDB flat which was purchased in his own name when 
he was 35 years old and a single person. Subsequently, X married Y.  
X and Y have a daughter together, Z. Shortly after the birth of their 
daughter, X discovers he has a terminal disease. X now wishes to 
bequeath the HDB flat solely to his minor child, Z. Since Z is a minor 
and cannot hold property in her own name, a trust must be created in 
Z’s favour. X has the following three ways to deal with the bequest to Z: 
Option A: X makes a Will leaving the HDB flat to Z. Upon 
X passing away, X’s executors would draw up the necessary trust 
deed naming Z as the beneficiary. Before settling the trust,  
X’s executors would seek HDB’s written approval in relation to 
this express trust. Once HDB’s approval is given, the flat would 
then be transferred to the trustees to be held on trust for Z. 
Option B: X creates a trust in favour of Z in his Will, 
naming the trustees and stipulating the terms of the trust.  
X seeks HDB’s written approval of the express trust to be 
created in the Will after the Will has been executed. Once HDB’s 
approval is given, the flat would then be transferred to the 
trustees upon X’s death to be held on trust for Z. 
Option C: X creates a trust in favour of Z in his Will, 
naming the trustees and the terms of the trust. No approval is 
sought from HDB at the time when the Will is executed. Upon 
X passing away, X’s executors would seek HDB’s written 
approval of the trust created in the Will. Once HDB’s approval 
is given, the flat would then be transferred to the trustees upon 
X’s death to be held on trust for Z. 
10 Option A and Option B appear to be the safest options in 
carrying out X’s bequest to Z. Option A leaves the issue of settling the 
trust to X’s executors whereas in Option B, the Will actually creates the 
trust for Z’s benefit. Although both methods would probably achieve the 
same result, the drawback to Option B is this: would HDB entertain 
© 2012 contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
  
(2012) 24 SAcLJ HDB Flats, Trust and Other Equitable Doctrines 475 
 
such a request for written approval at this stage? Or would HDB take the 
position that such a request for written approval to be premature? It is 
respectfully suggested that HDB should entertain such requests for 
approval rather than rejecting such requests as being premature because 
such an approach would give peace of mind to property owners who 
will have the certainty that the trust will be created upon their demise. 
11 Option C is trickier to analyse. There are two possible analyses 
of the possible outcome of an unapproved express trust over a HDB flat 
contained in the Will. The first analysis is that the trust is void due to the 
literal wording of s 51(9) of the HDA.12 The argument in support of this 
analysis is that since the Will purports to create a trust, the testamentary 
trust is properly constituted once the testator passes away if the debts, 
taxes and expenses of the estate do not exhaust the HDB flat. If the 
proposition that the trust is constituted immediately upon death of the 
testator is correct, then there is the argument that the purported trust is 
automatically avoided by s 51(9) of the HDA. This is because the words 
used in s 51(9) is unequivocal in prohibiting an unapproved express 
trust, that “every trust … without the prior written approval of the 
Board shall be null and void” as compared to the relevant provisions on 
constructive and resulting trusts of the HDA.13 Since the trust had been 
properly constituted and rendered ineffective by s 51(9) of the HDA, it 
is too late for the executors of the Will to seek approval from HDB. Such 
an analysis is also consistent with the general maxims of equity: “equity 
will not assist a volunteer” and “equity does not perfect an imperfect 
gift”. This is the likely position that would be argued by the beneficiaries 
of the residuary clause in the Will or the disinherited wife, Y, if there is 
no residuary clause in the Will. If the trust is avoided, then the HDB flat 
falls to be distributed as per the residuary clause in the Will. Absent a 
residuary clause, the HDB flat would then be governed by the Intestate 
Succession Act.14 A possible criticism of this conclusion is that this 
analysis is unduly harsh to the child, Z, and does not facilitate the 
intention of the testator who intended to bequeath the whole HDB flat 
to the child albeit by way of a trust. However, it is possible to meet  
this criticism. In this case, Z is not left without a remedy; she has a right 
to sue the solicitor (by using her next friend as her litigation 
representative) who drafted the Will for negligence pursuant to White v 
Jones.15 The measure of damages in this case would be the solicitor’s 
negligent drafting which ultimately caused Z to lose half the share in the 
HDB flat. Since Z would be properly compensated by the solicitor or his 
or her insurers, Y can argue that the courts should not adopt a strained 
construction of the HDA and “rescue” the purported trust. Otherwise, 
                                                                       
12 Housing and Development Act (Cap 129, 2004 Rev Ed) s 51(9). 
13 See s 51(10) of the Housing and Development Act (Cap 129, 2004 Rev Ed). 
14 Cap 146, 1985 Rev Ed. 
15 [1995] 2 AC 207. 
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to validate the purported trust would be tantamount to an unjustified 
redistribution of property rights. 
12 An alternative analysis validating the unapproved trust in 
Option C is equally possible. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson said in  
T Choithram International SA v Pagarani,16 “[a]lthough equity will not 
aid a volunteer, it will not strive officiously to defeat a gift”. Consistent 
with this philosophy, it is suggested that the courts might adopt a more 
benevolent construction in order to save the trust. As such, it could be 
possible that the trust over the HDB flat is saved by the Re Rose17 
doctrine. Recall Re Rose stands for the proposition that equity treats a 
transfer of property as complete in equity if the donor did everything in 
his or her power to transfer the property to the donee. Similarly, it could 
be argued by analogy that in this case the trust is valid, save for the final 
step of asking for approval from the HDB. In other words, the trust is 
characterised as not fully constituted save for the approval from HDB. 
Hence, the executors and/or the prospective trustees could perfect the 
trust by asking for HDB’s approval after the testator’s demise. If the trust 
is inoffensive vis-à-vis HDB policies, the HDB can give the necessary 
approval. Yet another characterisation saving the trust is to argue that 
the trust was not constituted upon X’s demise. At that time, Z’s interest 
in the unadministered estate was merely a spes or a hope.18 Whether  
Z’s interest crystalises will depend on HDB’s approval and the fact that 
the debts and expenses of the estate do not exhaust the HDB flat. Thus, 
the executors could seek HDB’s approval for the trust and HDB is 
entitled to give such approval. As a matter of drafting, it could therefore 
be advantageous to insert into the Will that the intended trust for the 
minor is “subject to HDB’s approval”. 
13 However, the analyses above in favour of saving the trust will 
not work if the terms of the purported trust in the Will are incompatible 
with HDB policies. An illustration of a trust which might offend HDB 
policies is a trust which directs the trustee to exclude the testator’s wife 
and child from staying in the flat and mandating the trustee to lease out 
the whole HDB flat to third parties in order to accumulate an income 
for the testator’s child. Such a direction to the trustee could be argued to 
be in breach of prevailing HDB policies on subletting of the whole HDB 
flat. If so, it follows that HDB cannot give approval to such a trust which 
offends its own policies. Can the executors of the Will or prospective 
trustees then amend the terms of the trust and submit a modified trust 
                                                                       
16 [2001] 1 WLR 1 at 11 (noted J Hopkins, “Constitution of – A Novel Point” (2001) 
60 CLJ 483; C Rickett, “Completely Constituting an Inter Vivos Trust: Property 
Rules?” [2001] Conv 515). 
17 [1952] Ch 499. See also Pennington v Waine, Crampton [2002] 1 WLR 2075 
(noted T M Yeo & H Tjio “Re Rose Revisited – The Shorn Lamb’s Equity” [2002] 
LMCLQ 296; C H Tham, “Careless Share Giving” (2006) 70 Conv 411). 
18 Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v Livingston [1965] AC 694. 
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to HDB for approval? It is suggested that the executors or prospective 
trustees do not have such a right to do so for two reasons. First, the 
executors of the Will or prospective trustees do not have a power to 
rewrite the terms of the intended trust. It is a cardinal principle that a 
trustee derives his or her power from the original trust document. If the 
trust document contemplates that the trust property is to be used in a 
certain manner which renders it void, the executors of the Will or 
trustee cannot unilaterally change the terms of the trust in an attempt to 
validate the trust. A simple hypothetical example supports this position. 
Let us say the trust contemplates that beneficial interest would only  
vest in the beneficiary after the perpetuity period. The trustee or the 
executors of the Will cannot save such a trust by unilaterally declaring 
that the trust is to vest within the perpetuity period. In such a case, the 
trust is simply invalid due to the rule against remoteness of vesting. 
Similarly, if the document which creates the trust (in this case the Will) 
contemplates an arrangement which is in breach of HDB policies, it is 
suggested that the executors of the Will or the prospective trustees do 
not have a right to vary the terms of the trust in order to persuade HDB 
to approve the trust. 
14 The second objection to the executors or the prospective 
trustees varying the trust is that there is the difficulty in identifying the 
source of the executor’s or prospective trustee’s right to amend the trust. 
Unlike England, there is no specific legislation in Singapore which 
allows the trustee to vary the terms of a trust.19 Thus, a trustee may only 
vary the terms of a trust if there is a provision for variation in the trust 
documents. This is the first hurdle to variation. Even if the Will contains 
an express clause allowing the trustee to vary the terms of the trust, 
there is the further conceptual difficulty of invoking such a clause. This 
is because the argument in favour of saving the trust over the HDB flat 
is that the trust has not been constituted pending HDB’s approval. If 
this is the correct analysis, then it is difficult to make the argument that 
the prospective trustee may invoke a term in a trust to amend a trust 
which has not yet been constituted. 
15 A possible solution to the conundrum described above is to 
draft the trust as an executory trust.20 The learned editors of Underhill 
and Hayton, Law of Trusts and Trustees21 defines an executory trust as 
follows: 
An executory trust is one where the trust property is vested in trustees 
or personal representatives but the interests to be taken by the 
                                                                       
19 See M Hwang & N Thio, “Why does Singapore not have a Variation of Trusts Act?” 
(2011) 23 SAcLJ 58. 
20 The author is immensely grateful to the anonymous referee for highlighting this 
point. 
21 (David Hayton gen ed) (LexisNexis, 2010) at p 101. 
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beneficiaries remain to be delimited in some subsequent instrument 
pursuant to the settlor’s clear general intention or where the property 
intended to be subjected to trusts is the subject of an enforceable 
agreement to create a trust whether for delimited beneficiaries or 
beneficiaries that remain to be delimited. [reference omitted] 
16 If the trust is drafted as an executory trust, this will permit the 
personal representatives of the estate to draw up a detailed trust deed 
after the death of the testator which will include obtaining HDB’s 
approval. The option of an executory trust might be an ideal solution to 
this problem. In other words, the executory trust is able to further the 
testamentary wishes of the HDB owner and does not require HDB to 
prematurely approve a trust in a Will. 
17 The discussion above demonstrates that there is so much 
uncertainty surrounding the simple process of bequeathing a HDB flat 
to a minor child. This is an extremely unsatisfactory situation as this is a 
common occurrence facing many HDB owners with minor children. 
The current complicated and opaque legal position surrounding this 
process represents a trap for the unwary testator whose wishes may be 
frustrated if his or her legal advisor did not draft the Will in the 
appropriate manner and seek HDB approval in a timely manner. In 
order to encourage people to plan for their next of kin, the process 
should be streamlined and made clear. It is, therefore, suggested that it is 
incumbent on HDB to make the process of bequeathing a HDB flat to a 
minor child more transparent, either by way of subsidiary legislation or 
a prescribed procedure published on its website. If HDB’s position is  
for HDB owners to draft an executory trust, then this should be  
clearly stated on their website. Furthermore, it would be helpful to list 
guidelines on the terms of a trust which HDB would find acceptable. 
Correspondingly, HDB should also give examples of trust terms which 
would be rejected by HDB. 
IV. Resulting trusts over HDB flats 
18 The jurisprudence surrounding resulting trusts over HDB flats 
has a chequered history. Numerous legislative attempts were made to 
apparently extinguish the doctrine of resulting trusts vis-à-vis HDB flats 
and yet the Singapore courts have consistently refused to interpret these 
legislative amendments as completely ruling out the operation of a 
resulting trust. As a starting point, the overriding principle in this area is 
that a resulting trust over a HDB flat in favour of a person ineligible to 
own a HDB flat must be prohibited. Otherwise, ineligible persons would 
provide the purchase price to eligible persons to buy a HDB flat and 
assert a purchase price resulting trust over the property. To recognise 
such a resulting trust would defeat HDB’s strict conditions of eligibility 
to acquire a HDB flat. 
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19 Cheong Yoke Kuen v Cheong Kwok Keong22 (“Cheong Yoke Kuen”) 
is an illustration of the principle against declaring a resulting trust over 
a HDB flat in favour of an ineligible person. In this case, a mother and 
son were co-owners of the HDB flat. Subsequently, the son was allocated 
a new HDB flat. Under HDB rules, a person was not entitled to own 
more than one HDB flat. Consequently, the son transferred his interest 
to his mother who became the sole owner. Some years later, the mother 
passed away intestate. The son asserted a resulting trust over the 
mother’s HDB flat on the ground that he paid for, inter alia, the down 
payment and all the outgoings in relation to the HDB flat. However, this 
claim was resisted by the mother’s estate; the primary contention was 
that the resulting trust was in breach of the then s 51(4) of the HDA.23 
Section 51(4) of the HDA provided that “[n]o trust … shall be created 
by the owner thereof without prior written approval of the Board”. As a 
starting point of his analysis, L P Thean JA said: “It [a resulting trust] 
arises from a certain transaction carried out intentionally by the parties 
concerned and the court infers an intention to create a trust in favour of 
a party.”24 On the evidence, L P Thean JA reasoned that when the son 
“transferred his interest in the flat to the mother, he intended to remain 
the beneficial owner of the flat. By such transfer he in effect ‘created’ a 
trust of the flat in his favour.”25 Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that 
the resulting trust was in breach of s 51(4) of the HDA since it was 
“created” by the son. 
20 The ultimate holding of Cheong Yoke Kuen is undoubtedly 
correct. What is controversial is LP Thean JA’s characterisation that a 
resulting trust was “created” by the son given the fact that the 
jurisprudential basis of the resulting trust is a heavily contested subject.26 
Perhaps a better rationalisation of this case is that the son had an 
express (albeit unarticulated) intention of retaining an equitable interest 
in the HDB flat and only granted his mother a life interest over the flat. 
This is consistent with the son’s evidence that the HDB flat was not an 
outright gift to his mother but only for the mother to live there during 
her lifetime. It follows that the son’s claim was essentially an attempt to 
maintain an express trust over the flat with the mother as a trustee 
holding the reversionary interest for him. Such a claim premised on an 
express trust fails because: (a) the HDA bars an unapproved express 
trust; (b) there was no evidence that the intention to create an express 
trust was shared by his late mother; and (c) there was a lack of 
compliance with formality provisions in settling the express trust. 
                                                                       
22 [1999] 1 SLR(R) 1126. 
23 Housing and Development Act (Cap 129, 1997 Rev Ed). 
24 Cheong Yoke Kuen v Cheong Kwok Keong [1999] 1 SLR(R) 1126 at [17]. 
25 Cheong Yoke Kuen v Cheong Kwok Keong [1999] 1 SLR(R) 1126 at [20]. 
26 See critique by B Crown, “Trusts of HDB Flats” [1999] Sing JLS 635. On resulting 
trusts, see Tan Sook Yee’s Principles of Singapore Land Law (S Y Tan, H W Tang & 
K Low eds) (LexisNexis, 2009) at pp 129–141. 
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21 In Cheong Yoke Kuen, L P Thean JA expressed some sympathy 
for the son despite dismissing his claim. In refusing to order costs 
against the son, the learned judge said:27 
[The son] had done a lot for the family eg providing a home for the 
mother, and at one time for the first and third appellants [his siblings], 
and the flat was acquired solely by his own effort. None of the 
appellants had made any contribution towards the acquisition; but, 
they would soon be getting a piece of the windfall. 
22 The discussion above demonstrates that a co-owner who 
transfers his or her share of the HDB flat to the other co-owner is 
precluded from asserting a trust by reason of the HDA if the co-owner is 
no longer eligible to own the flat due to HDB rules.28 In such 
circumstances, it would be better for the co-owner to apply to court for 
a sale in lieu of partition,29 rather than attempt to assert a resulting trust 
claim after the flat had been transferred. Gurnam Kaur v Harbhajan 
Singh30 is an illustration of an application for a judicial sale. The 
plaintiff, a widow, and the defendant, her son, were joint tenants of a 
HDB flat. The son got married and the relationship between mother 
and son deteriorated to such an extent that the mother left the flat. The 
mother instituted court proceedings seeking an order that the joint 
tenancy be severed and for the property to be sold and that the net 
proceeds to be divided between her and the son. The application was 
allowed by Tan Lee Meng J. If a co-owner needed a place to stay during 
his or her lifetime, it is suggested that the court could fashion 
appropriate remedies during the application for sale. For example, 
borrowing from family law jurisprudence, the court could order the flat 
to be transferred to a co-owner with the consideration to be paid by the 
other co-owner at a later date. 
23 The subsequent two cases of Sitiawah Bee bte Kader v Rosiyah 
bte Abdullah31 (“Sitiawah”) and Neo Boh Tan v Ng Kim Whatt32 are 
instances where the courts declared resulting trusts in favour of eligible 
claimants. In Sitiawah, a mother and daughter were registered as  
joint tenants of a HDB flat in Ang Mo Kio. The purchase price was 
$27,100.00. The father paid $6,231.00 and the remainder was paid from 
                                                                       
27 Cheong Yoke Kuen v Cheong Kwok Keong [1999] 1 SLR(R) 1126 at [28]. 
28 An interesting question is whether a claimant is entitled to seek restitution for 
contributing to the purchase price of the flat by asserting an unjust enrichment 
claim. The difficulty with such a claim would be establishing the ground of restitution 
or “unjust factor” and whether the HDA precludes an unjust enrichment claim. 
This issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
29 See Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 18(2), First Sch 
para 2. 
30 [2004] 4 SLR(R) 420. 
31 [1999] 3 SLR(R) 606. 
32 [2000] SGHC 31. 
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the daughter’s Central Provident Fund. Subsequently, the relationship 
became strained and the mother applied to court for the HDB flat to be 
sold. In determining the respective shares of the parties, the daughter 
asserted a resulting trust as she had paid more towards the acquisition 
of the flat. Before the hearing, the mother attempted to unilaterally sever 
the joint tenancy. As a finding of fact, S Rajendran J found that the 
father had paid the moneys on behalf of the mother. The learned judge 
crystalised the question at hand as such:33 
Does the resulting trust postulated as a result of unequal contributions 
to the purchase price survive the application of s 51(4)? [of the HDA] 
24 Rajendran J held that in the present case, the resulting trust was 
not “created” by a flat owner but arose by reason of a presumption of 
law. As such, the learned judge held that the prohibition against the 
creation of a trust found in the HDA did not preclude an eligible owner 
from claiming for a larger share via a purchase price resulting trust. 
Rajendran J therefore ordered that the flat be sold and the proceeds of 
the sale to be divided between the mother and daughter in the ratio of 
23:77. Besides the holding that a resulting trust may arise in favour of  
an eligible co-owner, the other important point of Sitiawah is that a 
purported severance of a joint tenancy does not preclude a court from 
declaring that the co-owners hold the flat in shares proportionate to 
their initial contribution to the purchase price. In Sitiawah, the mother 
had unilaterally severed the joint tenancy before the hearing and yet the 
judge declared a resulting trust over the HDB flat. 
25 The second case which allowed a resulting trust claim in favour 
of an eligible person is Neo Boh Tan v Ng Kim Whatt34 (“Neo Boh Tan”). 
In this case, the mother and her youngest son were the joint owners of a 
HDB flat. The mother paid the down payment and serviced the loan 
taken to purchase the flat. In August 1998, the son hit his mother and 
the mother made a police report. Subsequently, the son moved out of 
the flat and the mother lost all contact with her son. The mother applied 
for a declaration that she was absolutely entitled to the HDB flat. In this 
action, the son could not be located and the proceedings were served on 
him by substituted service which included, inter alia, an advertisement 
published in a Chinese newspaper. Judith Prakash J followed Sitiawah 
and held that the resulting trust in favour of the mother was not in 
breach of s 51(4) of the HDA. On the facts of Neo Boh Tan, the mother 
was eligible to own the HDB flat and therefore HDB policies were not 
infringed. One unexplored aspect of Neo Boh Tan is whether a resulting 
trust claim which effectively gives the claimant 100% interest in the flat 
would be in breach of HDB rules. In this case, the flat was allocated 
                                                                       
33 Sitiawah Bee bte Kader v Rosiyah bte Abdullah [1999] 3 SLR(R) 606 at [13]. 
34 [2000] SGHC 31. 
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pursuant to HDB’s Resettlement Scheme and there was no evidence 
before the court that the scheme mandated that the HDB flat must  
be jointly owned. Furthermore, even if HDB rules mandated joint 
ownership under a certain scheme, the claimant may overcome this 
objection easily as a matter of pleadings; the claimant could simply not 
ask for 100% of the share of the flat. Thus, if joint ownership is 
mandated by HDB rules, then a claimant may ask for 99% share of the 
flat by pleading that he or she has provided for 99% of the purchase 
price. 
26 In September 2005, s 51(6) of the HDA was enacted. 
Section 51(6) provided:35 
No person shall become entitled to any such flat, house or other 
building under any resulting trust or constructive trust, whensoever 
created. 
27 This legislative provision gave rise to the following question: 
was there now an absolute prohibition against the finding of a resulting 
trust over HDB flats? Tan Chui Lian v Neo Liew Eng36 (“Tan Chui Lian”) 
was the first case to interpret this provision. In this case, the son and 
father owned the flat as tenants-in-common. Upon his father’s death, 
the son applied to court for an order that the HDB flat be sold on the 
open market with the sale proceeds to be divided in the ratio of the 
contribution of the parties towards the purchase moneys of the flat. The 
purchase price of the flat was approximately $29,000.00 in 1979. The 
son had contributed $21,000.00 and the father $8,000.00. The father 
had also contributed $10,000.00 towards the costs of renovation at the 
time the property was purchased, $5,300.00 towards renovation costs 
undertaken in 1997 and $3,553.45 being the estate upgrading costs 
imposed by the HDB subsequently. Due to these contributions, the 
father’s estate argued that a constructive or resulting trust arose in 
favour of the estate. There was an initial issue of whether a constructive 
or resulting trust can arise over an HDB flat because of s 51(6) of the 
HDA. Sundaresh Menon JC (as he then was) applied the decisions of 
Sitiawah37 and Neo Boh Tan38 and held that a constructive or a resulting 
trust could arise over an HDB flat between two eligible co-owners of the 
flat. As a matter of statutory interpretation, Menon JC reasoned that 
s 51(6) of the HDA only prohibited constructive or resulting trusts 
arising in favour of persons who would otherwise have been ineligible to 
acquire an interest in an HDB flat. In other words, the section was 
meant to:39 
                                                                       
35 Housing and Development Act (Cap 129, 2004 Rev Ed) s 51(6). 
36 [2007] 1 SLR(R) 265. 
37 [1999] 3 SLR(R) 606. 
38 [2000] SGHC 31. 
39 Tan Chui Lian v Neo Liew Eng [2007] 1 SLR(R) 265 at [10]. 
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… prevent any entitlement to own an HDB flat arising in favour of a 
person by virtue of the law implying a resulting or constructive trust, 
where that person would otherwise have been ineligible to acquire 
such an interest. 
28 Menon JC said that this interpretation is bolstered by the fact 
that s 51(6) of the HDA used the phrase “[n]o person shall become 
entitled” to an interest as opposed to the phrase “no person shall 
acquire” an interest in an HDB flat. These words suggest that s 51(6) of 
the HDA was merely a codification of the previous law. Furthermore, 
Menon JC pointed out that this provision seemed to be retrospective in 
nature. A restrictive construction would mean that Parliament was 
retrospectively displacing accrued property rights and there was nothing 
in the Parliamentary Debates that suggested that this was the legislative 
intent. As such, Menon JC reasoned that since both co-owners were 
eligible to be HDB owners in the present case, the situation fell outside 
the mischief of s 51(6). Menon JC’s holding is obviously correct. 
29 It should be noted that s 51(6) is now found in s 51(10). 
Section 51(10) reads:40 
No person shall become entitled to any protected property (or any 
interest in such property) under any resulting trust or constructive 
trust whensoever created or arising. 
30 The interesting question is whether s 51(10) statutorily 
overturns the holding of Tan Chui Lian.41 One interpretation is that  
the prohibition against resulting trust or constructive trust over HDB 
flats “whensoever … arising” is meant to address the point made by 
Rajendran J in Sitiawah. The learned judge had reasoned in that case 
that a resulting trust arose by operation of law and was not created by 
the parties and was therefore not prohibited by the words of the Act. 
Hence, on this argument, an assertion of a resulting trust will fail 
because s 51(10) specifically prevents a resulting trust from arising. On 
reflection, it is argued that the amendments to s 51(10) cannot be taken 
to have statutorily overturned Tan Chui Lian for two reasons. First, one 
of the main planks of Menon JC’s reasoning is that the provision in the 
HDA only prevents a resulting or constructive trust arising in favour of 
a person who is ineligible to own an HDB flat. Since the crucial phrase 
“[n]o person shall become entitled” remains in the section, it is 
suggested that Tan Chui Lian is still good law. Such an interpretation 
was recently confirmed by Prakash J in Koh Cheong Heng v Ho Yee 
Fong.42 Prakash J said:43 
                                                                       
40 Housing and Development Act (Cap 129, 2004 Rev Ed) s 51(10). 
41 Tan Chui Lian v Neo Liew Eng [2007] 1 SLR(R) 265. 
42 [2011] 3 SLR 125. 
43 [2011] 3 SLR 125 at [56]. 
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Although the amended legislation includes the words ‘or arising’ at the 
end of the relevant provision, in my opinion the addition of the words 
‘or arising’ only clarify that a ‘resulting trust’ or a ‘constructive trust’ 
may be more properly said to arise by operation of law, rather than by 
the creation of parties. It is neither evident from Hansard, nor from 
the plain reading of the provision, that Parliament was seeking to 
change the legal position as it stood in Tan Chui Lian. Indeed, if such a 
change was deemed necessary, Parliament could have said for instance, 
‘No person shall become entitled, regardless of eligibility, …’. This 
Parliament did not do. Furthermore, the words ‘become entitled’, 
which formed the basis for Menon JC’s judgment, were left unchanged 
by Parliament. As Menon JC expressly noted in his judgment, it would 
have been much ‘plainer and simpler’ for Parliament to have said  
that no person shall ‘be entitled to any interest in’ an HDB flat if 
Parliament were indeed minded to prohibit all trusts, regardless of the 
beneficiary’s eligibility (Tan Chui Lian at [11]). Again, Parliament did 
not make such a change. Accordingly, in my view, the law regarding 
creation of trusts over HDB property remains as stated in Tan Chui 
Lian. [emphasis in original] 
31 Second, as Menon JC pointed out, resulting and constructive 
trusts are accrued property rights. Although Singapore’s Constitution44 
does not elevate property ownership to a constitutional right, deprivation 
of accrued property rights is a grave matter that must at least be debated 
and seriously considered in Parliament. It does not appear that there 
was any trace of such a debate in Parliament. Section 51(10) was 
amended on the back of amendments to matters relating to caveats and 
moneylenders and all the discussion in Parliament was about the issue 
of moneylenders caveating HDB flats. As such, it is suggested that it 
could not be Parliament’s intention to deprive eligible owners of 
accrued property rights. 
32 The resulting trust doctrine is also useful in the context of 
Muslim divorces where the property issue is not resolved by the Syariah 
Court. Section 35 of the Administration of Muslim Law Act45 provides 
that the Syariah Court has the jurisdiction to hear inter alia:46 
… all actions and proceedings in which all the parties are Muslims or 
where the parties were married under the provisions of the Muslim 
law and which involve disputes relating to … (b) divorces known in 
the Muslim law as fasakh, cerai taklik, khuluk and talak; or (d) the 
disposition or division of property on divorce or nullification of 
marriage … 
                                                                       
44 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev Ed). 
45 Cap 3, 2009 Rev Ed. 
46 Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap 3, 2009 Rev Ed) s 35(2). 
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33 In the context of a Muslim divorce, the Syariah Court has the 
jurisdiction to hear parties on the issue of division of property. 
However, in some cases the issue of the division of property might not 
be before the Syariah Court. Hartinah bte Sahlan v Mohammed Juma’at 
Dollar47 (“Hartinah”) is an illustration of such a situation. In Hartinah, 
two actions were consolidated and heard by the High Court. Both cases 
involved a divorce by consent registered by a kadi of the Syariah Court. 
In other words, there were no divorce proceedings and the division of 
matrimonial property was not a live issue before the Syariah Court. This 
was unfortunate because the HDB flat was registered in joint names. 
Subsequently, the claimants in both actions applied to the High Court 
for a declaration of a resulting trust over the HDB flat. As a preliminary 
matter, the High Court had to determine whether it had the necessary 
jurisdiction to hear this dispute. In holding that the High Court had the 
necessary jurisdiction to hear this dispute, Christopher Lau JC followed 
the analysis of Chan Sek Keong J in Muhd Munir v Noor Hidah48 (“Muhd 
Munir”). In Muhd Munir, Chan J said that one of the pre-conditions for 
the Syariah Court to assume jurisdiction is that there must be occasion 
for the Syariah Court to exercise its power. Chan J said that an instance 
where the Syariah Court had no occasion to exercise its power on 
custody of minor children is a situation where there is no divorce 
application before the Syariah Court and where the parties divorced 
through a kadi. Although Muhd Munir was concerned with the issue of 
custody of Muslim children, Lau JC found Chan J’s analysis very apt. On 
the facts, since there was no occasion for the Syariah Court to exercise 
its power on division of matrimonial property, Lau JC felt that the  
High Court was not constrained by the Administration of Muslim Law 
Act. Lau JC declared a purchase price resulting trust in favour of the 
plaintiffs in both cases. 
34 Before leaving this area, there is a practical point on the burden 
of proof involved in a resulting trust claim which needs to be developed. 
The case of Loo Chay Sit v Estate of Loo Chay Loo, deceased49 provides 
useful guidance on this issue. Here, there was an alleged resulting trust 
over a property at 7 Margate Road. The property was registered in the 
name of Loo Chay Loo who immigrated to the US. Loo Chay Loo 
murdered his adopted son in the US and then attempted to commit 
suicide. While Loo Chay Loo was in a coma in a hospital in the US, Loo 
Chay Sit, the older brother, instituted an action alleging that Loo Chay 
Loo held the property on resulting trust for him by reason of a purchase 
price resulting trust. Thus, this entire case turned on a question of fact: 
was the claimant able to prove on a balance of probabilities that he paid 
for the purchase price? Andrew Phang JA who delivered the judgment of 
                                                                       
47 [1998] 2 SLR(R) 103. 
48 [1998] 2 SLR(R) 103 at [14]. 
49 [2010] 1 SLR 286. 
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the Court of Appeal went through a meticulous exposition of the law 
pertaining to the burden of proof which is beyond the scope of this 
essay. For the purposes of this essay, it is sufficient to note that the 
starting position is that since the property was registered in Loo Chay 
Loo’s name, the estate was entitled to rely on the presumption of 
indefeasibility by reason of s 46 of the Land Titles Act.50 In order for Loo 
Chay Sit to displace Loo Chay Loo’s title, Loo Chay Sit had to prove that 
Loo Chay Sit paid for the property so as to establish a resulting trust. 
Thus, Loo Chay Sit bore the primary legal burden of proving his case. 
The facts surrounding the payment of the purchase price were murky 
because the property was bought in the 1970s and the documentation 
involving the purchase price was unsatisfactory. On the facts, the Court 
of Appeal found that the estate of Loo Chay Loo had proved that Loo 
Chay Sit did not pay for the property but was unable to prove that Loo 
Chay Loo had paid for the purchase price. As such, the estate of Loo 
Chay Loo succeeded in dismissing the resulting trust claim because  
the estate was entitled to rely on the presumption of indefeasibility. 
Therefore, in a purchase price resulting trust claim, the claimant will 
have the onus of proving that he or she provided for the purchase price. 
In contrast, there is no obligation on the defendant to demonstrate an 
affirmative defence, that the defendant was the one who came up with 
the purchase price. The defendant is entitled to rely on the register to 
establish the prima facie position of ownership. 
35 In this author’s recent paper on “Conflict in Land Law 
Jurisprudence I: Co-Ownership and Collective Sales”,51 it was suggested 
that given the practical difficulties associated with the resulting trusts, 
the policy makers at the Land Registry may wish to consider providing 
co-owners with the option of holding the property on an irrebuttable 
joint tenancy in the appropriate land transfer form. This suggestion 
could be equally applicable to HDB flats; HDB could introduce a 
mandatory form to be filled in at the time of acquisition of the flat 
giving the co-owners the option of stating that the parties intend to hold 
the property on an irrebuttable joint tenancy or in irrebuttable fixed 
shares as tenants in common. Such a form would as a matter of evidence 
preclude the assertion of a resulting trust. Over time, such a move might 
reduce the incidence of resulting trust claims in future. However, in 
reviewing the cases on resulting trusts in this area, this author has 
become more ambivalent about the earlier suggestion. While a form 
stipulating an irrebuttable joint tenancy or irrebuttable tenancy in 
common would certainly promote certainty, it appears to be a blunt 
                                                                       
50 Cap 157, 2004 Rev Ed. 
51 H W Tang, “Conflict in Land Law Jurisprudence I: Co-Ownership and Collective 
Sales” in SAL Conference 2011: Developments in Singapore Law between 2006 and 
2010 – Trends and Perspective (T M Yeo, H Tjio & H W Tang gen eds) (Singapore 
Academy of Law, 2011) at p 519. 
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instrument as opposed to the resulting trust doctrine which is a more 
sensitive doctrine in achieving justice between the parties. For example, 
in Neo Boh Tan,52 the resulting trust yielded a favourable result for the 
mother who paid for the entire purchase price of the flat and suffered 
elder abuse in the hands of the other co-owner, her own son. Similarly, 
in Hartinah, one of the claimants, the wife, was able to obtain a 
declaration for 76% share of the HDB flat against the other co-owner, 
her husband, who had been in and out of drug rehabilitation centres 
and prison. The cases in this area demonstrate the perennial struggle 
that judges and lawmakers face in crafting a law which promotes 
certainty and yet is capable of achieving justice between the parties. 
Perhaps some degree of uncertainty in this area is a worthwhile price to 
pay so that an equitable result in these complex familial relationships 
may be reached. 
V. Common intention constructive trusts over HDB flats 
36 While the resulting trust is commonly argued in relation to  
a HDB flat, there is not much case law on the common intention 
constructive trust. It is easy to explain the paucity of decisions on the 
common intention constructive trust in Singapore. Typically, the 
common intention constructive trust is used as a means to divide the 
property of unmarried couples when the relationship breaks down. This 
is because the couple being unmarried53 cannot resort to the provisions 
of the Women’s Charter54 to settle the issue of division of property. 
Unlike England, long term co-habitation is rarer in Singapore due to 
cultural and differing social norms. In this regard, the law’s ambivalence 
with regards to co-habitation is illustrated by V K Rajah JA’s judgment 
in Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence,55 where he refused to extend 
the presumption of advancement to co-habiting couples, saying that 
“given that legislative recognition and public consensus about the status 
of de facto relationships have yet to emerge locally”,56 the extension of 
the presumption of advancement to such relationships is presently 
unwarranted. Quite apart from this, it is also surmised that there is an 
economic reason why long term co-habitation and property disputes are 
rare in Singapore. Due to the very high costs of property, it is speculated 
                                                                       
52 [2000] SGHC 31. 
53 For a recent example involving an unmarried couple, see Wong Meng Cheong v 
Ling Ai Wah [2012] 1 SLR 549. 
54 Cap 353, 2009 Rev Ed. 
55 [2008] 2 SLR(R) 108. 
56 [2008] 2 SLR(R) 108 at [63]. On the presumption of advancement, see T H Tey, 
“Singapore’s Muddled Presumption of Advancement” [2007] 2 Sing JLS 240; K Low, 
“Apparent Gifts: Re-Examining the Equitable Presumptions” (2008) 124 LQR 369; 
R Yeo, “The Presumptions of Resulting Trust and Advancement in Singapore: 
Unfairness to the Woman?” (2010) 24 International Journal of Family Law and 
Policy 123. 
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that unmarried couples would rather prefer to enter a short-term lease 
of a home instead of purchasing a property together. As such, if the 
relationship breaks down, there is no dispute over a property which is 
acquired during the co-habitation period. 
37 With regard to HDB flats, the common intention constructive 
trust arises infrequently because couples usually get married prior to the 
acquisition of the HDB flat.57 In the days when there was a long waiting 
list for HDB flats, couples would first go through the civil process of 
marriage at the Registry of Marriages in order to be eligible to buy  
a HDB flat, before holding the traditional wedding ceremony some 
months later. It is postulated that this housing policy has had the social 
effect of encouraging couples to get married rather than co-habitating 
with each other. By getting married, the couple becomes eligible to buy  
a HDB flat and pool their Central Provident Funds to service the 
mortgage payments. If the relationship breaks down, the couple would 
usually resolve disputes over the property by way of the provisions in 
the Women’s Charter and not through the doctrine of the common 
intention constructive trust. 
38 Thus far, there is only one reported case involving a common 
intention constructive trust over a HDB flat. In Tan Poh Soon v Phua Sin 
Yin,58 the couple was married in 1963 and the flat was acquired in the 
husband’s sole name. In 1969, the husband moved to the Netherlands 
without his wife. In 1989 or 1990, the husband instituted divorce 
proceedings against the wife in the Netherlands and the Dutch court 
granted the divorce. No ancillary relief was sought in the Dutch divorce 
proceedings. Subsequently, the wife filed an originating summons in 
Singapore asking for, inter alia, a declaration that she was entitled to a 
share of the HDB flat pursuant to s 56 of the Women’s Charter, which 
provided that the judge may make such order with respect of the 
property as he or she thinks fit. This section has been interpreted by  
P Coomaraswamy J in PQR v STR59 as being premised on the “cold 
principles of English property law and especially that of the law of 
trusts”. In Tan Poh Soon, G P Selvam J applied the doctrine of the 
common intention constructive trust as articulated in Lloyds Bank v 
Rosset60 to the facts at hand. As a preliminary matter, Selvam J did not 
think that then s 51 of the HDA prohibiting a trust over a HDB flat 
nullified the court’s power to declare a common intention constructive 
trust. The judge rightly said that a constructive trust was not created by 
the owner but rather decreed by the court pursuant to a statutory 
                                                                       
57 See C Tan, “‘We are Registered’: Actual Processes and the Law of Marriage in 
Singapore” (1999) 13 IJLPF 1. 
58 [1995] 2 SLR(R) 583. 
59 [1992] 3 SLR(R) 744 at [10]. 
60 [1991] 1 AC 107. 
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provision. On the facts, the learned judge declared there was a 
constructive trust in favour of the wife. As a matter of evidence, the 
judge found that the husband had told the wife that there was no need 
to include her name as the flat was for both of them. In terms of 
detriment and reliance, the wife had made substantial contribution to 
the maintenance and payment of conservancy and other charges in 
respect of the flat. Furthermore, the learned judge said that the wife was 
prevented from purchasing another HDB flat in her own name by 
remaining in the relationship. Finally, if the wife had not stayed in the 
HDB flat, the flat would have been “compulsorily acquired” by HDB. 
Therefore, Selvam J held that the elements of a common intention 
constructive trust was satisfied and declared that the wife had a half 
share over the HDB flat. 
39 Tan Poh Soon is potentially an important decision because  
G P Selvam J’s ultimate holding was extremely generous to the wife:  
a declaration of 50% share in favour of the wife of a HDB flat purchased 
solely in her husband’s name. In this case, the wife did not seem to  
have contributed a lot in monetary terms save for the payment of the 
maintenance and conservancy charges. In order to get over this problem, 
Selvam J construed the wife’s continued occupation of the HDB flat as a 
form of detriment because this prevented her from buying her own flat. 
However, it should be pointed out that this case is unusual because there 
was evidence of an express common intention made by the husband to 
his wife that the HDB flat was for both for them until their death. 
Usually, evidence of such an express common intention is absent61  
and the wife would have to prove direct financial contribution to the 
purchase price in order to establish the element common intention.62 
Does this case signify the beginning of a more liberal Singapore 
jurisprudence on the common intention constructive trust in relation to 
married couples and the HDB flat?63 It is still probably too early to make 
any predictions based on a single case. Even though Tan Poh Soon was 
decided more than 15 years ago, there are not many Singapore cases that 
have been argued on the basis of the common intention constructive 
trust. To date, Tan Poh Soon remains the only reported decision on the 
HDB flat and the common intention constructive trust. It should also be 
noted that following from Tan Chui Lian read with Koh Cheong Heng, 
the common intention constructive trust is not precluded by the current 
version of the HDA, if the declaration is sought in favour of an eligible 
person to own a HDB flat. An unresolved difficulty is whether Singapore 
                                                                       
61 See, for example, Walker James Edward v Hong Geok Choo [1996] SGHC 87, where 
the claim for the common intention constructive trust failed because the plaintiff 
was not able to establish a common intention. 
62 On proving common intention, see Jones v Kernott [2011] 3 WLR 1121. 
63 Cf Chia Kum Fatt v Rolfston v Lim Lay Choo [1993] 2 SLR(R) 793, where Warren 
Khoo J refused to consider non-financial contributions in quantifying the shares of 
the parties. 
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would follow the recent jurisprudence of the English courts on the 
common intention constructive trust. The Supreme Court in Jones v 
Kernott64 said that in looking for a common intention, the court’s task is 
to look for a genuine common intention held by the parties. If such a 
common intention can be found, then the next stage is to determine the 
shares of the parties. This inquiry involves a search for the result which 
parties must, in the light of their conduct, be taken to have intended.65 
A fuller examination of the implications of the case of Jones v Kernott is 
beyond the scope of this article due to space constraints.66 
40 Despite its rarity in Singapore case law, the common intention 
constructive trust might provide some relief to the “disinherited foreign 
wife”. This problem stems from the growing phenomenon of local 
Singaporean men marrying foreign wives from places such as Vietnam 
or China through matchmaking agencies. In these matchmaking 
arrangements, typically the man chooses the woman from a photo 
catalogue and the agency would arrange for the couple to meet either in 
Singapore or overseas. After meeting several times, the man can choose 
to marry the woman. In return for its services, the groom has to pay the 
agency a matchmaking fee that can go up to $10,000.00. In terms of the 
age profile, the groom is typically older and the wife is much younger. 
Problem arises when the man passes away and bequeaths the flat not to 
his wife but his own family, that is his parents or siblings.67 It is surmised 
that the primary motivation of such a move is a fear that the foreign 
wife will realise the proceeds of the HDB flat and return with the 
children to her country of origin. Another possibility is that the foreign 
wife is not considered to be part of the family but as an “other”.68 
Unfortunately, stereotypical assumption of the foreign woman abound, 
and Chinese women are sometimes pejoratively referred to as a wuya  
(a crow, which is a Chinese colloquial term for a gold digger). One 
unexplored legal aspect from this social phenomenon is whether the 
common intention constructive trust is able to provide relief to the 
                                                                       
64 [2011] 3 WLR 1121. 
65 See Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432. 
66 The literature on this is voluminous. For a sample, see, for example, S Gardner & 
K Davidson, “The Supreme Court on Family Homes” (2012) 128 LQR 178;  
R H George, “Cohabitants’ Property Rights: When is Fair Fair” (2012) 71 CLJ 39; 
M Yip, “The Rules Applying to Unmarried Cohabitants’ Family Home” [2012] 
Conv 159; M Pawloski, “Imputed Intention and Joint Ownership – A Return to 
Common Sense” [2012] Conv 149; J Mee, “Jones v Kernott: Inferring and Imputing 
in Essex” [2012] Conv 167. 
67 See, for example, T Tan, “In Sickness & In Death; When Their Husbands Die, 
Foreign Brides Can Be Left Without Home, Money, or Even the Right to be in 
S’pore” The Straits Times (30 April 2011). 
68 See Q Zhou, “Chinese Marriage Migration in Singapore” (2010) (unpublished 
Masters thesis, National University of Singapore). 
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disinherited wife in this context? Alcina Chew69 has begun valuable work 
in examining the difficulties associated with such a claim. She points out 
that the main difficulties associated with such claims are as follows: 
(a) In most of these cases, it is very difficult to pinpoint the 
element of common intention. Due to the fact that in these 
relationships, the man is generally the dominant party and  
the wife being younger and meeker, an articulated common 
intention is rarely found. In Lloyds Bank v Rosset,70 Lord Bridge 
said that in absence of an express common intention, an inferred 
common intention may be found if the wife contributed to the 
purchase price.71 However, in the context of the foreign wife, the 
wife is usually a homemaker and does not have the means or 
opportunity to contribute to the purchase price of the HDB flat. 
(b) Even if a common intention could be found, the wife 
would have problems establishing the necessary detriment. 
While long criticised by many commentators as sexist, the 
orthodox doctrine of common intention constructive trust do 
not consider homemaking duties as satisfying the requisite 
detriment to invoke the common intention constructive trust. 
(c) Even if the foreign wife can satisfy the elements of a 
common intention constructive trust, the application of the 
HDA might preclude the declaration of a constructive trust in 
her favour. This is because the foreign wife might not be a 
Singapore citizen or permanent resident. In other words, the 
foreign wife is ineligible to own a HDB flat. Therefore, the court 
is precluded from declaring a constructive trust in her favour. 
41 While there are certainly formidable difficulties in establishing 
such a claim, there is at least one case reported in The Straits Times 
where most of the elements of a common intention constructive trust 
are satisfied.72 In this case, the husband was reported to have made a 
                                                                       
69 A Chew, “The ‘Other’ Woman – Equitable Relief for the Disinherited Foreign 
Wife” (2011) (unpublished undergraduate thesis, National University of 
Singapore, archived at the C J Koh Law Library, National University of Singapore). 
70 [1991] 1 AC 107. 
71 Cf Jones v Kernott [2011]3 WLR 1121, where the Supreme Court did not mention 
the requirement for direct financial contribution in order to find an inferred 
common intention between the parties. S Gardner & K Davidson, “The Supreme 
Court on Family Homes” (2012) 128 LQR 178 at 179 argues that “[b]y their 
conspicuous absence, we can conclude that there is no longer any requirement, so 
as to prove an implied common intention, to point to the claimant’s direct 
financial contributions to the acquisition of the house; nor of detrimental reliance 
upon the common intention”. 
72 T Tan, “In Sickness & In Death; When their Husbands Die, Foreign Brides can be 
Left Without Home, Money, or Even the Right to be in S’pore” The Straits Times 
(30 April 2011). 
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video recording stipulating that he intended to give his HDB flat to his 
wife and child. It was also reported that when the man fell ill, the wife 
borrowed money in order to take care of him and pay for his hospital 
expenses. Prima facie, a strong claim for the common intention 
constructive trust may be made by the wife against her late husband’s 
estate. However, the principal difficulty in this case is that the wife was 
not a Singaporean or Singapore permanent resident. Hence, the court 
may not declare that the HDB flat is held on a constructive trust on  
her behalf. In any case, the wife and her child were entitled to a  
three-quarter share of the flat due to the effect of the Intestate 
Succession Act,73 with the other one quarter share going to her late 
husband’s daughter from his first marriage. Despite not being applicable 
on the present facts, it is suggested that lawyers ought to be alert about 
the fact that the common intention constructive trust might provide 
some relief in certain circumstances to these vulnerable group of 
women. 
VI. Proprietary estoppel and HDB flats 
42 Another underdeveloped area in Singapore jurisprudence is 
proprietary estoppel74 claims in the relation to disappointed heirs.  
In these cases, the usual factual pattern is a defendant who makes a 
representation to the plaintiff that the plaintiff will inherit the 
defendant’s property; in reliance on this representation, the plaintiff 
incurs substantial detriment such as either taking care of the defendant 
or working for the defendant for a long period of time in return for low 
wages. Subsequently, the defendant decides to bequeath his or her 
property to someone else or passes away intestate. In the latter situation, 
the defendant’s next of kin would be the one entitled to the property 
and not the plaintiff. It is in this context that the plaintiff brings an 
action against the defendant or the defendant’s estate in proprietary 
estoppels, alleging that it is unconscionable for the defendant to renege 
on his or her representation that the plaintiff is to inherit the 
defendant’s property. 
43 In England, there are two very well-known cases where the 
disappointed heir has succeeded in a claim in proprietary estoppel. In 
Gillett v Holt,75 the defendant made repeated representations to the 
plaintiff that the plaintiff would inherit the defendant’s estate. In 
reliance on these representations, the plaintiff worked for the defendant 
for more than 40 years at very low wages and subordinated his personal 
                                                                       
73 Cap 146, 1985 Rev Ed. 
74 See generally, Tan Sook Yee’s Principles of Singapore Land Law (S Y Tan, H W Tang & 
K Low eds) (LexisNexis, 2009) at pp 153–176. 
75 [2001] 3 Ch 210. 
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and professional life to the defendant’s wishes. Unfortunately for the 
plaintiff, the defendant then developed a relationship with a younger 
man and chose to bequeath all his property to the younger man. In 
Gillett v Holt, the plaintiff successfully sued the defendant in a claim 
premised on proprietary estoppel and the English Court of Appeal held 
that the plaintiff was entitled to some part of the defendant’s property.  
A more recent case is the House of Lords’ decision in Thorner v Major.76 
The claimant worked on the defendant’s farm for no pay for 30 years  
on the basis of defendant’s representation that the claimant would 
eventually inherit the farm. The defendant passed away intestate and the 
claimant brought a claim against the defendant’s estate on the ground of 
proprietary estoppel. This claim was allowed by the House of Lords 
because their Lordships found that all the elements of a claim for 
proprietary estoppel had been satisfied. 
44 Besides the factual pattern of Thorner v Major and Gillett v Holt, 
another situation in which a proprietary estoppel may arise is between 
an elderly person and his or her caregiver. An illustration of such a case 
is Jennings v Rice.77 The claimant was the defendant’s long time general 
helper and part-time gardener for many years since the 1970s. Since the 
1980s, the defendant stopped paying the claimant. Three years before 
the defendant’s death, the claimant took care of the defendant to the 
extent that he slept on the defendant’s couch every night. The defendant 
assured him that he would see him right and sometimes told him “this 
will all be yours someday”. In the end, the defendant died intestate and 
the claimant brought an action in proprietary estoppel against the 
defendant’s estate. The English Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and 
granted the claimant £200,000.00 in satisfaction of the equity that had 
arisen in his favour. 
45 With a rapidly aging population and the shrinking of the 
nuclear family in Singapore, it is speculated that claims by caregivers 
against elders based on proprietary estoppel might become increasingly 
commonplace. Of course, the difficulty with such claims would be the 
potential impact of the HDA. Thus far, there is one local case which has 
considered this issue, Low Heng Leon Andy v Low Kian Beng Lawrence.78 
The plaintiff lived with his grandmother and his aunt in a HDB flat 
owned by the grandmother and aunt as joint tenants. The aunt was 
stricken with cancer and the plaintiff took care of his aunt. Subsequently, 
the aunt passed away. The grandmother was also in poor health and it 
was the plaintiff who took care of her as well. The grandmother passed 
                                                                       
76 [2009] 1 WLR 776 (noted M J Dixon, “Proprietary Estoppel: A Return to 
Principle” [2009] Conv 260; B Sloan, “Estoppel and the Importance of Straight 
Talking” [2009] Conv 154). 
77 [2003] 1 P & CR 8. 
78 [2011] SGHC 184. 
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away intestate and the plaintiff ’s aunts and uncles became entitled to  
the flat. Since the plaintiff had no beneficial interest in the estate, the 
grandmother’s administrator tried to remove the plaintiff from the flat 
on the ground that he was an illegal occupier. In response, the plaintiff 
brought a claim against the estate alleging that the grandmother had 
promised him that he could live in the flat as long as he wanted and he 
could use the flat as his family home. In reliance on those promises, the 
plaintiff acted to his detriment by acting as a caregiver and paying for 
household and medical expenses. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged he 
had given up a more lucrative job and worked from home as a private 
tutor to take care of his grandmother. The administrator attempted  
to strike out the plaintiff ’s claim, inter alia, on the ground that the 
plaintiff ’s claim was precluded by s 51(10) of the HDA. In refusing to 
strike out the claim, Assistant Registrar Paul Chan rightly held that the 
claim did not offend s 51(10) of the HDA because the plaintiff was not 
seeking an interest in the HDB flat. Instead, the plaintiff was “merely 
asking for equitable damages in order to satisfy the equity raised”.79  
Asst Registrar Chan held that this relief was within the court’s discretion 
to grant and the claim was not barred by s 51(10) of the HDA. The 
decision of the learned assistant registrar is undoubtedly correct as  
the claim is framed as a personal claim for equitable compensation. 
However, it is suggested that s 51(10) of the HDA is not fatal to a 
proprietary estoppel claim even if the plaintiff had asserted a constructive 
trust over the HDB flat. Following the jurisprudence on the resulting 
trust and common intention constructive trust, it is likely that s 51(10) 
of the HDA would be interpreted purposively so as not to bar a 
constructive trust claim as long as the plaintiff is eligible under HDB 
rules to own a HDB flat. 
46 An unresolved difficulty is this: if the minimum needed to 
satisfy the equity is a proprietary interest, what would be the outcome if 
the claimant is an ineligible person?80 Would a court be obliged to deny 
the proprietary interest on the basis of public policy or “illegality” and 
order a monetary award in lieu of the proprietary interest? There are 
two responses to this difficult question. First, as a matter strategy, 
lawyers who are advising a claimant who is ineligible to own a HDB flat 
must be very careful in asking for the appropriate prayers. It is suggested 
that as a matter of prudence, such a claimant should ask for a monetary 
award instead of a proprietary interest. Second, even if an ineligible 
claimant asked for a proprietary interest, it is contended that such a 
claimant should not precluded from being granted a monetary award. 
Such a monetary award is meant to satisfy an equity that has been raised 
due to a representation made by the defendant to the claimant. Unlike 
                                                                       
79 [2011] SGHC 184 at [62]. 
80 The author is grateful to the anonymous referee for raising this point. 
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PP v Intra Group (Holdings) Co Inc,81 where an award of a monetary 
remedy would have the effect of undermining the Residential Property 
Act,82 the underlying policy of the HDA is not compromised by a 
monetary award in the context of proprietary estoppel claim. 
47 Before leaving this section, it should be mentioned that the 
doctrinal flexibility of the remedy in proprietary estoppel claims might 
make it attractive for a plaintiff who is ineligible under HDB rules to 
own a HDB flat. With reference to the facts reported in The Straits Times 
about the foreign wife who took care of her husband and borrowed 
money for his medical bills, if the requisite representation was present, 
the wife could maintain a proprietary estoppel claim against the estate. 
Her immigration status as a person ineligible to own a HDB flat would 
not be fatal to the claim because like the claimant in Low Heng Leon 
Andy v Low Kian Beng Lawrence,83 she could frame her remedy as one 
seeking equitable compensation and not an interest over the flat. Of 
course, this would be a weaker claim and may yield a lesser amount in 
terms of monetary value. As discussed above, the wife in that case need 
not resort to a common intention constructive trust or proprietary 
estoppel claim because she had a share over the HDB flat by reason of 
the Intestate Succession Act.84 
VII. Donatio Mortis Causa and HDB flats 
48 The final equitable doctrine in relation to HDB flats discussed 
in this paper is donatio mortis causa, which is a gift that is conditional 
upon death. In Koh Cheong Heng v Ho Yee Fong85 (“Koh Cheong Heng”), 
the plaintiff and defendant were an elderly married couple with no 
children. Initially, the plaintiff was the sole owner of a HDB flat. In 2006, 
while the plaintiff was in the hospital and thinking he would not recover 
from his illness, he transferred the HDB flat to himself and the 
defendant, as joint tenants. The plaintiff recovered from his illness but, 
unfortunately, the defendant suffered a fall two years later and became 
gradually incapacitated. Subsequently, the plaintiff became concerned 
that should he predecease the defendant, the flat would eventually be 
distributed to the defendant’s relatives in accordance with the Intestate 
Succession Act.86 The plaintiff was not happy about this possible 
outcome and sought to revoke the gift using the doctrine of donatio 
                                                                       
81 [1999] 1 SLR(R) 154. 
82 Cap 274, 2009 Rev Ed. 
83 [2011] SGHC 184. 
84 Cap 146, 1985 Rev Ed. 
85 [2011] 3 SLR 125 (noted R Leow, “Donatio Mortis Causa of Registered Land in the 
Singapore High Court: Koh Cheong Heng v Ho Yee Fong” (2011) 25 Trust Law 
International 145). 
86 Cap 146, 1985 Rev Ed. 
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mortis causa. After reviewing the facts, Judith Prakash J held that the 
plaintiff ’s transfer of the flat to himself and the defendant was a valid 
donatio mortis causa. In cases of gifts transferred pursuant to the 
doctrine of donatio mortis causa, the learned judge held that such a gift 
remains defeasible until the death of the donor. In other words, the 
donor had the power to revoke the gift if the donor did not eventually 
pass away. Prakash J reasoned that this power of revocation is best 
explained by way of a remedial constructive trust, where the court 
enjoyed the discretion to determine whether a proprietary remedy 
should be granted.87 While acknowledging criticism of the possible wide 
ranging effect of the remedial constructive trust, the learned judge held 
that using the remedial constructive trust to explain the theoretical basis 
of the power of revocation in this context would not result in widespread 
uncertainty. Prakash J held that such a rationalisation of the power of 
revocation did not offend the HDA because the plaintiff was not an 
ineligible person to own a HDB flat. Adopting a purposive interpretation 
of the HDA, the learned judge allowed the plaintiff to revoke the 
transfer of the flat. 
49 It is respectfully suggested that the power to revoke gifts should 
be exercised with extreme circumspection. As a matter of policy, a too 
generous doctrine of revocation has the effect of undermining security 
of receipts. This author has argued elsewhere that gifts are not 
inconsequential and unimportant transactions that should be easily set 
aside.88 Furthermore, as a matter of doctrinal analysis, Koh Cheong 
Heng89 does not rest on a very stable foundation. The primary authority 
relied on in Koh Cheong Heng is the case of Staniland v Willott90 for the 
proposition that a completed gift made pursuant to the doctrine of 
donatio mortis causa may be revoked. However, it is should be pointed 
out that in substance, the remedy that the plaintiff was seeking was the 
rescission of a completed gift. In this regard, the relevant test to rescind 
a gift is the “serious mistake” test as articulated as follows by Lindley LJ 
in Ogilvie v Littleboy:91 
In the absence of all circumstances of suspicion a donor can only 
obtain back property which he has given away by showing that he was 
under some mistake of so serious a character as to render it unjust on 
the part of the donee to retain the property given to him. 
                                                                       
87 On remedial constructive trust, see H W Tang, “The Constructive Trust in 
Singapore: Five Persistent Puzzles” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 136 at 142–148. See also  
T H Tey, “Constructive Trusts – Deciphering and Distinguishing ‘Institutional’ 
and ‘Remedial’” (2011) 23 SAcLJ 250. 
88 H W Tang, “Restitution for Mistaken Gifts” (2004) 20 JCL 1. 
89 Koh Cheong Heng v Ho Yee Fong [2011] 3 SLR 125. 
90 (1852) 3 Mac & G 664. 
91 (1897) 13 TLR 39. 
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50 Pitt v Holt,92 a recent English Court of Appeal decision, has 
endorsed the “serious mistake” test in relation to rescission of a 
mistaken gift.93 Unless it is suggested that Staniland v Willott94 survives as 
a sui generis doctrine to govern the revocation of gifts in the context of 
donatio mortis causa, there is a strong case to be made that the test for 
rescission of completed gifts is based on the “serious mistake” test. Thus, 
the primary inquiry is whether the plaintiff in Koh Cheong Heng95 was 
under a “serious mistake” that he would not survive for long when he 
made the gift to his wife. It is respectfully suggested that there are grave 
difficulties in construing such a gift as a form of “serious mistake”. Too 
generous a view of a “serious mistake” might lead to many gifts being 
rescinded. On the facts of Koh Cheong Heng, it could be argued that this 
was not a case of a mistake but a regretted decision. If the plaintiff had 
indeed passed away shortly after the gift was made, the property would 
eventually have gone to his wife’s relatives. Why should he then have 
cause for complaint in these circumstances? It seems that this is a 
situation where there is no real mistake associated with the transfer  
but rather a failure to consider the implications of joint tenancy and 
succession law. In any case, the plaintiff could have either severed the 
joint tenancy or characterised his claim as one premised on the doctrine 
of resulting trust. There was no need to invoke the doctrine of remedial 
constructive trust which is fraught with uncertainty. 
VIII. Conclusion 
51 In this article, the jurisprudence pertaining to the express trust, 
resulting trust and common intention constructive trust, proprietary 
estoppel and the HDB flat have been reviewed. It is suggested that if 
these doctrines are analysed properly and sensitively with regard to 
HDB policies, they still have an important role to play in regulating the 
relationships of those who might have a claim over HDB flats. In 
particular, the doctrines of the common intention constructive trust 
and proprietary estoppel might provide some relief to the disinherited 
wife. This article also suggests that there might, in future, be claims 
against HDB flats via proprietary estoppel by disappointed heirs. With 
respect to revocation of gifts by way of the use of donatio mortis causa, 
                                                                       
92 [2011] 3 WLR 19. 
93 It has been suggested to me that the donatio mortis causa is a common law doctrine 
of conditional gift and the criticism of Koh Cheong Heng v Ho Yee Fong [2011] 
3 SLR 125 by reference to Pitt v Holt [2011] 3 WLR 19 is misplaced. Pitt v Holt 
[2011] 3 WLR 19 expounds the doctrine of mistake as applied by the courts to 
equitable transfers of property which is far removed from donatio mortis causa 
cases. The author is unconvinced by this argument. There does not seem to be any 
reason why the law should maintain different rules in relation to what is essentially 
a similar problem, the rescission of a completed gift. 
94 (1852) 3 Mac & G 664. 
95 Koh Cheong Heng v Ho Yee Fong [2011] 3 SLR 125. 
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the author would advise caution in adopting too generous a view of 
rescission of a gift for essentially what is a regretted decision. 
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